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NOTE
RESEARCH AND RELATORS: THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT AND
SCIENTIFIC MISCONDUCT
In an era of heightened concern with waste in government, I Congress
has given considerable attention to the issue of scientific fraud and mis-
conduct2 because of its worries about how researchers and institutions
spend federal grant monies.3 The problem is a delicate one, involving the
1. Since 1988, Congress has held four separate hearings in an attempt to define the scope of
waste in government and to devise ways for agencies and the scientific community to deal with it
effectively. See Scientific Fraud and Misconduct and the Federal Response" Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Human Resources and Intergovernmental Relations of the House Comm. on Government
Operations, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988); Fraud in NIH Grant Programs: Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1988); Scientific Fraud: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of
the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); Maintaining the Integrity
of Scientific Researck Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Investigations and Oversight of the House
Comm. on Science, Space, and Technology, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) [hereinafter Maintaining the
Integrity]. See also Judith Randal, Spate of Ethical Breaches Worries the Research Community,
WASH. POST, Dec. 6, 1988, at Z I I (members of Congress and the scientific community worry that
medical sloppiness and deception will affect patient care); Jamie Talon, Fudging Research Science,
NEWSDAY, Dec. 13, 1988, Discovery, at 5; Philip J. Hilts, Possible Misconduct Is Seen in Discovery
ofAIDS Virus, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 1990, at 1 (NIH investigates one of this country's most respected
AIDS researchers, Robert Gallo, based on allegations that Gallo's lab misappropriated the AIDS
virus from a French researcher); Daniel S. Greenberg, Science Can Ill Afford to Squander the Pub-
lic's Trust, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 7, 1991, at 3 (asserting that the scientific community, which depends on
public confidence and support, should strive to avoid misconduct); Anthony Flint, MIT's Vest Urges
Restoration of Universities' Values, Goals, BOSTON GLOBE, May 11, 1991, Metro, at 27 (in response
to cases of scientific fraud and other scandals, MIT president said that "Public confidence in our
universities must be fully restored."); John Crewdson, Scientist Denies Charges in AIDS Probe, CHI.
TRIB., Aug. 15, 1991, at 1 (NIH investigates researcher Mikulas Popovic in "the biggest ever investi-
gation of fraud in a government laboratory." Popovic denied that apparently fraudulent assertions
published in an article on AIDS were his).
2. See generally WILLIAM BROAD & NICHOLAS WADE, BETRAYERS OF THE TRUTH (1982);
ALEXANDER KOHN, FALSE PROPHETS (1986); Patricia K. Woolf, Deception in Scientific Research,
29 JURIMETRICS J. 67 (1988).
3. A number of federal agencies support individual scientists and research institutions. Some
of the most prominent include the Public Health Service (PHS), the National Institutes of Health
(NIH) (a branch of the PHS), and the National Science Foundation (NSF). In 1987, 15 federal
agencies distributed nearly all of the federal research and development money going to colleges and
universities. NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION, FEDERAL SUPPORT TO UNIVERSITIES, COLLEGES,
AND SELECTED NONPROFIT INsTrrtrnoNs: FISCAL YEAR 1987, at IX (1989). Total grants that
year were $13,466,552,000. Id. at 9. The NSF provided $1,069,500,000 in academic sci-
ence/engineering support. Id. at 10. The HHS, which includes the PHS and NIH, provided
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resolution of important and sometimes opposing interests.4
Federal agencies pour large amounts of money into scientific research.5
Agencies waste any money they give to fund a project based on false or
unreliable data. Granting agencies, thus, have explored ways6 to bal-
ance the federal government's interest in accounting for its money
against the need to preserve the freedom necessary to keep scientific re-
search strong.7 With the 1986 amendment to the Federal False Claims
Act,8 Congress enlarged an alternative avenue for addressing the prob-
lem through the use of private plaintiff, also known as qui tam, actions9
brought by whistleblowers against either scientists or research institu-
tions in the name of the United States. 0
Part I of this Note examines the nature and scope of the problem of
scientific fraud. It defines the degrees of misconduct, discusses the corre-
sponding levels of culpability, and considers self-policing methods within
$4,193,800,000. Id. In addition, 2,879 universities and colleges received federal money that year.
Id. at 121.
4. Even defining misconduct is a complicated issue, because it can vary greatly in its severity.
See infra notes 19-34 and accompanying text.
5. The federal government spent over $60 billion on research in 1988 alone. NATIONAL SCI-
ENCE FOUNDATION, FEDERAL FUNDS FOR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT: FISCAL YEARS 1986,
1987, 1988 VOL. XXXVI, at 16 (1987). See also supra note 3.
6. See infra notes 51-87 and accompanying text.
7. Scientists must be free to explore new areas without the fear of an agency looking over their
shoulders. Though the difference between innovation and fraud is immense, imposing unnecessarily
strict standards on research could produce a chilling effect on science in general. See Robert M.
Andersen, The Federal Government's Role in Regulating Misconduct in Scientific and Technological
Research, 3 J.L. & TECH. 121 (1988). Personal autonomy is a key factor in creative scientists'
personalities. RICHARD S. MANSFIELD & THOMAS V. BUSSE, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CREATIVITY
AND DISCOVERY: SCIENTISTS AND THEIR WORK (1981). This manifests itself in a need for indepen-
dence and a rejection of outside influences. Research chemists, physical and biological scientists,
and industrial research scientists each display this tendency. Id. at 52-53.
8. 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (1986) (amending 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (1982)). See generally Richard J.
Oparil, The Coming Impact of the Amended False Claims Act, 22 AKRON L. REv. 525 (1989).
9. In a qui tam action, a private plaintiff, having knowledge of an allegedly false claim which
defrauds the government, brings a civil action in the government's name to recover damages for the
allegedly false claim. See infra notes 88-113 and accompanying text. The principal reason for the
1986 amendment was the increasing accounts of defense contractor fraud. See infra notes 108-11
and accompanying text.
10. The Justice Department, having the option of joining the suit under the False Claims Act,
recently joined a case that a lab technician brought against a scientist and two major universities.
The case is pending in a federal district court in San Diego. See U.S. Justice Department Joins Civil
Fraud Case Against Two Universities, BUSINESS WIRE, Aug. 21, 1990; Colleen Cordes, U.S. Enters
Lawsuit Accusing Scientist, Institutions of Fraud, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Sept. 5, 1990, at Al.
This suit alleges some $1.2 million in damages, which the court may treble under the False Claims
Act. Id. See infra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
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the scientific community. Part II explores present attempts to develop
methods to deal with allegations of fraud. Part III examines both the use
of qui tam actions and the changes wrought by the 1986 amendment.
Finally, Part IV concludes that because qui tam actions, a powerful tool
to combat fraud against the government, are not particularly well suited
for addressing the problem of scientific misconduct, Congress must con-
sider alternatives.
I. BACKGROUND: THE SCOPE OF SCIENTIFIC FRAUD
It is essential to examine the nature of scientific misconduct to evaluate
the various means used to address it. The context in which scientific
misconduct occurs presents regulators1 1 with a unique problem.
There are varying degrees of scientific misconduct, ranging from bla-
tant forgery to subtle manipulation of data. 2 Misconduct may not be at
all obvious. 3 The researcher's expectations may influence her interpre-
tation of the data collected in an experiment.1 4 Additionally, the scien-
tific community has at times forgiven misconduct as time has passed and
the community has accepted the researcher's underlying ideas. 5
Trying to define the varying degrees of blameworthiness or culpability
involved in scientific misconduct is problematic. 6 Clearly, the outright
fabrication of data is something that federal agencies and the scientific
community should prevent; but it is difficult both to define the more sub-
tle gradations of scientific misconduct and to attach to such gradations
11. For an examination of federal agency attempts to regulate research, see infra notes 51-87
and accompanying text.
12. For examples of the spectrum of scientific misconduct, see infra notes 19-36 and accompa-
nying text.
13. There is a fine line between a researcher who intentionally manipulates data and one who
may unconsciously do so, at least as it may appear to an outside observer. See infra notes 32-34 and
accompanying text.
14. See infra note 32.
15. Isaac Newton is probably the most surprising example of such a phenomenon. In his clas-
sic Principia, Newton bolstered some of his theories by manipulating data to more precisely fit his
conclusions. Newton's indulgence in the falsification of data demonstrates how even the most princi-
pled of scientists may succumb to temptation. Scientists did not discover Newton's alterations for
250 years. BROAD & WADE, supra note 2, at 27-29. See also infra note 32.
16. Different types of conduct involve varying degrees of fault. Any strategy to curtail scientific
misconduct must be flexible enough to take this into account. Federal agencies responsible for the
administration of grants for scientific research have attempted to formulate definitions of miscon-
duct. See infra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
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degrees of culpability.' 7 Because the line between intentional fraud and
simple, innocent sloppiness is difficult to discern, any scheme to deal with
scientific misconduct must detect and dismiss spurious or groundless
claims to avoid seriously damaging an accused researcher."8
A. Defining Scientific Misconduct
Scientific fraud manifests itself in many different ways. Observers
note, however, three generally identifiable degrees of possible scientific
misconduct: outright fabrication, the "cleaning up" of legitimate data,
and self-deception.' 9
Outright fabrication is the wholesale forgery of data, the making up of
an experiment out of thin air.20 It is the most extreme, probably the
rarest, and should be, at least in theory, the most detectable form of mis-
conduct.21 However, a number of researchers have successfully
fabricated entire experiments for long periods of time.22 For example, in
one case, a researcher allegedly engaged in misconduct, including the
forging of data, for ten years and continued his behavior beyond the mis-
conduct's initial detection.23
17. See BROAD & WADE, supra note 2, at 20; KOHN, supra note 2, at 4; Woolf, supra note 2, at
70-71.
18. See Steven G. Olswang & Barbara A. Lee, Scientific Misconduct: Institutional Procedures
and Due Process Considerations, 11 J.C. & U.L. 51 (1984). In addition, due process considerations
most often are present in publicly funded institutions. A faculty member at such an institution has a
protected property interest deriving from the employment contract. Id. at 58. Moreover, the de-
struction of a researcher's reputation can form the basis of a liberty interest. Id. at 59. See Board of
Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972) ("a person's good name, reputation, honor or integrity"
can give rise to protected liberty interests).
19. BROAD & WADE, supra note 2, at 20. There are inevitably shades of behavior between
these general categories. Broad & Wade hypothesize that a researcher who begins to improve data
by making minor alterations may advance gradually to wholesale fabrication. Id.
20. KOHN, supra note 2, at 4. Some commentators consider scientific plagiarism a form of
forgery. Id. Plagiarism involves stealing parts or all of someone else's work and presenting it as
one's own. Id. One well-known instance of suspected plagiarism led to the discovery of other mis-
conduct by the accused researcher, a well-respected assistant professor at Yale. However, it took a
year and a half and a substantial amount of persistence on the part of the scientist whose research
the plagiarist appropriated to obtain an investigation that exposed the perpetration. BROAD &
WADE, supra note 2, at 161-78 (case of Vijay Soman).
21. BROAD & WADE, supra note 2, at 61. Some researchers believe that science's internal
controls will always expose this form of misconduct. Id. See infra note 37.
22. See generally Woolf, supra note 2, at 78. The case of Robert Slutsky involved alleged
fabrication that took place from 1974 to 1984. It was not disclosed publicly until 1986. In another
case, the alleged misconduct took place from 1975 until 1985. Id.
23. Id. In this case, the researcher, John Darsee, allegedly engaged in misconduct from 1974
until 1981. Id. Colleagues at Harvard Medical School observed him forging data for an experiment.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol70/iss2/20
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The perpetrator's culpability in this instance is clear.24 Fraudulent
data may taint not only the work of the researcher who engages in the
misconduct but also that of any legitimate researcher who bases further
work on the published fraudulent data.2" Thus, knowingly falsifying
data should and does warrant serious repercussions.26
The second tier of misconduct is somewhat different. Researchers
"clean up" data when they intentionally manipulate them to support
their thesis more strongly.2 7 Data "clean up" often involves a researcher
who accurately reports the methods she used in carrying out an experi-
He confessed when confronted, and the medical school allowed him to continue working in the
laboratory based upon his assertion that only on this occasion had he engaged in such behavior.
Darsee subsequently published a number of papers. He left the institution only after other evidence
of his misconduct began to surface. KOHN, supra note 2, at 84-88.
In another case, a scientist continued his misconduct for a year following its detection. Only
three years later did the public learn of the case, though the misconduct took place throughout a ten-
year period. See Woolf, supra note 2, at 78. Recently, a Nobel prize-winning scientist lent his name
to a paper that allegedly contained falsified data. See Philip J. Hilts, Nobelist Apologizes for Defend-
ing Research Paper With Faulty Data, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 1991, at 1; Dealing With Fraud in Sci-
ence, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 6, 1991, at 16; Malcolm Gladwell, Scientist Retracts Paper Amid Allegations
of Fraud; Draft Report Finds Researcher Falsified Data, WASH. POsT, Mar. 21, 1991, at Al. In this
case, Dr. Thereza Imanishi-Kari included Dr. David Baltimore's name as co-author of a research
paper that she wrote and primarily researched. Dealing With Fraud In Science, supra. Imanishi-
Kari submitted the paper to the prestigious journal Cell, which published it. After persistent at-
tempts by Dr. Margot O'Toole to bring the allegedly falsified data to light, the Office of Scientific
Integrity, a branch of the National Institutes of Health, launched an investigation into Imanishi-
Karli's research. See infra note 71. A draft report of the investigation indicated that the charges had
some basis. Gladwell, supra, at A6. Although the report does not implicate Dr. Baltimore, it
prompted him to apologize for his prolonged defense of Imanishi-Kari's work. Hilts, supra.
24. Not only is forgery unethical, but it can have other serious consequences as well. Contrary
to the common assumption that scientific fraud is a victimless crime, "the victims may be very
obvious: those who remained ill or died because fraud or carelessness diverted research away from
the problems that should have been investigated." SIGMA CHI, HONOR IN SCIENCE 6 (1986), re-
printed in Maintaining the Integrity, supra note 1, at 492.
25. Faulty information introduced into the scientific arena may spur genuine research based on
the original, flawed observations. KOHN, supra note 2, at 18. Therefore, "the same error is repeated
and thus non-existent phenomena confirmed." Id. An example of this phenomena, without the
occurrence of misconduct, took place in the 1960s. N.N. Fedaykih, a Soviet chemist, announced the
discovery of a new type of liquid called polywater. Id. at 26. Scientists later determined that poly-
water was merely the result of impurities present during the experiments in 1964-70. Before scien-
tists debunked the polywater myth, numerous scientists had spent time and resources investigating
it. Id. at 27-28.
26. Thus, engaging in conduct of this sort may permanently ruin a researcher's reputation,
making it extremely difficult, if not impossible, for the researcher to find future employment. See
Olswang & Lee, supra note 18, at 55. For possible agency sanctions when a researcher has misused
grant money, see infra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
27. KOHN, supra note 2, at 4. Within this category itself, a wide spectrum of behavior probably
exists. False reporting may include a scientist exaggerating the number of trials of an experiment she
Washington University Open Scholarship
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ment, but changes the raw data so that a chart or curve of the data ap-
pears smoother.28 In one such case, a scientist auditing a researcher
recalled how impressed he and others had been at the scientist's appar-
ently "clean" data curves prior to the revelation of misconduct.29
In these cases, the degree of the researcher's culpability is not as clear
as it is in the case of outright fabrication. While the cleaning up of data
is a thoroughly undesirable practice, both the dishonesty it involves and
the damage it causes are probably less than that involved in outright for-
gery.3 0 Another difference between forgery and manipulation is that the
latter is more difficult to discover.3a
Self-deception, the final identifiable degree of scientific manipulation,
occurs when a researcher's expectations affect the way in which he inter-
prets the experiment's data.32 A researcher's expectations may result in
conducted, or misrepresenting an error margin. Id. Other false reporting may involve a scientist
omitting from a paper results of experiments that are unfavorable to his thesis. Id.
28. Id.
29. BROAD & WADE, supra note 2, at 173-74. The accused researcher later admitted that he
had "smoothed out" the data in order to achieve the graceful curves that often are difficult to pro-
duce by legitimate means. The investigation later revealed that the researcher probably also had
engaged in wholesale fabrication of experiments. Id. See supra note 20.
The auditor's reaction can explain failures to detect such misconduct. Researchers who consist-
ently come up with such impressive looking data sometimes arouse not the suspicion, but the admi-
ration of their colleagues. BROAD & WADE, supra note 2, at 179. On the other hand, data that are
"too good" may arouse suspicion. See Woolf, supra note 2, at 87.
30. Cases involving "clean ups" are unlike those when a scientist completely has forged data.
KOHN, supra note 2, at 4. Because these cases involve manipulated but not wholly falsified data,
they likely are based, at least in part, on the truth. Id.
31. A reviewing scientist must usually audit a researcher's work to catch such misconduct. See
supra note 29 and accompanying text. It is difficult to determine, however, when a researcher's
work requires an audit, because of the natural variance that occurs between a scientific experiment's
trials. BROAD & WADE, supra note 2, at 75-77. In cases when the researcher accurately has de-
scribed the methods he used to arrive at his "cleaned up" data, investigating scientists may repeat
the experiment, but they would not be able legitimately to reach the same results and conclusions
that the fudged data reflect. Id. at 76. Investigating scientists often may attribute such an incongru-
ous result to the initial researcher's perceived skill rather than to any misconduct on his part. Id. at
71. In the case of scientist Vijay Soman, for example, supra note 29, investigators conducted an
audit only after accusations of plagiarism against him came to light. In addition, it took considera-
ble effort on the complaining researcher's part to initiate an inquiry. BROAD & WADE, supra note 2,
at 161-80. It is only once an investigator commences an audit and learns that the notes of the
laboratory data do not match the published data that he or she discovers the researcher's
manipulation.
32. See BROAD & WADE, supra note 2, at 107-25. A particularly extreme example of self-
deception, involving an entire scientific community, occurred in France in the early nineteenth cen-
tury. A French scientist claimed to have discovered what he called N-rays. The French scientific
community praised him and many scientists proceeded to publish papers examining the effects of N-
rays. Other scientists subsequently showed that N-rays do not exist. There is no evidence that any
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol70/iss2/20
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her interpreting data in a desired manner, possibly ignoring more prob-
able explanations or interpretations. 33 As a result, the researcher uncon-
sciously alters the data, and it may sometimes appear that she did so
intentionally. 34 Therefore, it may be difficult to differentiate between
cases in which a researcher intentionally has altered data and those in
which alterations were unconscious.
The difference between the two in terms of blameworthiness is, how-
ever, great. While those who intentionally manipulate data deserve seri-
ous sanctions, those who may have done so innocently do not.35 Such
instances of self-deception may arise not from an intention to deceive, but
rather from the researcher's deep faith in her work, a faith that goes so
one of the scientists knowingly committed fraud in their examination of the N-rays. They were
"taken in" by what they wanted and expected to see. Id at 112-13. Broad & Wade explain this
occurrence by noting that the French scientific community as a whole felt that it was falling behind
other nations' scientific progress. Thus, nationalistic pride played a significant part in the French
scientists' response to the "discovery" of N-rays. Id at 114. See also KOHN, supra note 2, at 18-34.
Simple sloppiness is a related problem that may occur when a scientist incorrectly performs an
experiment, and thus distorts its outcome. KOHN, supra note 2, at 18. To an outsider, the flawed
outcome may appear to be a case of misconduct. Leon Cooper, a Nobel Prize winning physicist,
addressed this type of occurrence:
We are aware that many experiments are extraordinarily difficult to do and the best and
most honest can be misled. In addition, as we have seen in recent instances involving high-
temperature superconductivity and cold fusion, the normal human desire to appear in the
papers, to announce the results first, to hold the first press conference, can lead to sloppy
work.
Leon N. Cooper, The Straw Man of Scientific Fraud, CH. TRIB., May 17, 1991, Perspective, at 27.
Professor Cooper points out that "one doesn't rush about trying to explain every bizarre result that
surfaces." Id. His solution to the problem centers around "investigat[ing] what it is that pressures
scientists." Id.
33. BROAD & WADE, supra note 2, at 108. The researcher's desire to believe the results is often
at the root of cases of self-deception. Id.
34. As in the N-ray case, supra note 33, the scientist who thought he had discovered these rays
did, in effect, make up the entire thing. BROAD & WADE, supra note 2, at 108. Yet the fraud was
self-inflicted. He truly believed in his finding's validity and this belief, in turn, impaired his ability to
be objective. Id. See also Woolf, supra note 2, at 71 (sloppiness, which sometimes must reasonably
be tolerated in an area of dynamic research, may be confused with intentional misconduct).
35. In their study, Broad and Wade state that "[s]elf deception and outright fraud differ in
volition--one is unwitting, the other deliberate." BROAD & WADE, supra note 2, at 105. A "double
blind" experiment may reduce this problem's occurrence. In this technique, a supervisor conceals
the identity of the experimental and control groups from the researcher to prevent the researcher
from projecting his expectations onto the research's results. Id. at 108-09.
Several agencies that grant research funds define misconduct in such a way as to take into account
a particular discipline's prevailing norms. By providing a relative standard against which an ob-
server may judge the degree of negligence, this formulation reduces the chance that the observer will
confuse simple negligence with intentional misconduct. See infra notes 58-59 and accompanying
text.
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far as to impede her ability to be objective. Error that self-deception
causes results not from the researcher's desire to promote herself, as does
intentional misconduct,3 6 but from her close involvement with her work
and ideas. Thus, punishing this behavior as intentional misconduct
would not deter intentional misconduct.
B. The Present System of Checks in Science
The scientific research process' self-monitoring system has three main
components: peer review, a referee system, and replication.37 The peer
review system is composed of a group of scientists who advise the gov-
ernment on how to distribute its funds to grant applicants. 38 Under the
referee system, scientific journals send submitted manuscripts to experts
in the field for review. 39 Finally, replication involves scientists repeating
each other's experiments to confirm the original results.4"
Commentators have exposed weaknesses in the traditional self-policing
methods.4 ' Because both the peer review and referee systems involve
other scientists' subjective determinations of the worthiness and quality
of research, they are limited in their ability to discover and deter miscon-
duct.42 Furthermore, replication often does not catch misconduct be-
36. A substantial number of cases of misconduct involve a researcher who tries to advance her
career by increasing her research output. BROAD & WADE, supra note 2, at 52-53. See also supra
notes 20 and 23.
37. BROAD & WADE, supra note 2, at 61. Some scientists believe that the checks inherent in
science itself deal adequately with potential problems. They argue, thus, that any potential external
controls are not only unnecessary but likely to damage scientific research. See Fraud in Biomedical
Research: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Investigation and Oversight of the House Comm. on
Science and Technology, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. 43, 76 (1981) (statements of several leading scientists
that a few aberrant individuals are responsible for misconduct and that it is not a general problem).
This attitude among scientists may not prove very productive in light of the congressional reaction to
it. Several members of Congress were taken aback by their perception that some scientists were
indignant that Congress was even conducting hearings on the subject. See BROAD & WADE, supra
note 2, at 11-13. At least one congressman expressed concern with the prestigious scientists' reluc-
tance to "take these matters very seriously." Id. at 11.
38. BROAD & WADE, supra note 2, at 11.
39. Id. at 62.
40. Id. In the traditional self-policing scheme, replication plays the most important role. Thus,
scientists expose fraudulent claims when they repeat the researcher's experiment and are unable to
achieve the original results in their own laboratories. This system should be foolproof. Id. How-
ever, this is not always so. See infra note 43 and accompanying text.
41. See generally BROAD & WADE, supra note 2, at 1-21; KOHN, supra note 2, at I-I1.
42. Observers often fail to take the possibility of misconduct seriously. BROAD & WADE, supra
note 2, at 179. Affiliation with a prestigious institution or a prominent researcher often can virtually
immunize a junior researcher from serious scrutiny. The more impressive a person's reputation as a
researcher is, the less chance that fellow scientists will investigate any allegations of misconduct. Id.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol70/iss2/20
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cause reviewing scientists do not replicate as frequently as they should.43
C. How Prevalent is Scientific Fraud?
The actual prevalence of scientific fraud is a matter of considerable
controversy. Estimates run from one commentator's viewing 99.999% of
the research conducted as untarnished, to a report that ninety percent of
scientists have personal knowledge of intentional misconduct.' It is cer-
tain, however, that recent cases have received a large amount of
publicity.45
Some commentators blame the scientific research system's structure
for imposing demands on researchers that lead to misconduct.46 The
pressure to publish also diminishes the effectiveness of science's tradi-
tional checks.47 One influential study describes the problem as having
See generally id. at 161-80. Moreover, a scientist may create the impression of success by engaging
in misconduct. Such misconduct can sometimes be self-sustaining. For example, in the Darsee case,
supra note 23, the researcher acquired a reputation for being incredibly productive. Ironically, this
reputation was principally a result of the researcher's scientific misconduct. Due to the scientific
community's erroneous perception of the researcher, however, it failed to take criticism of his work
seriously. See BROAD & WADE, supra note 2, at 13-15. See also supra note 29 and accompanying
text.
43. BROAD & WADE, supra note 2, at 76. Broad and Wade identify three reasons replication
serves only as a limited policing mechanism. Id. First, if published accounts do not contain all of an
experiment's details, other researchers may be unable to duplicate it effectively. Knowing this, other
scientists may not attempt to replicate the experiment. Id. Second, experiments often require large
amounts of resources, both financial and human. Consequently, scientists are unlikely to replicate
an experiment unless they expect that it will produce a significant outcome. Finally, there are few
incentives for a scientist to replicate another's experiment. Scientists receive very little credit for
replicating someone else's findings. The competitive world of science values originality most. Id.
44. Woolf, supra note 2, at 71.
45. See supra note I and accompanying text. The publicity of even a few cases creates pres-
sures to "do something" about the problem regardless of disputes as to the extent of the misconduct.
See infra note 115 (Congress must assure constituents that it is addressing the problem) (statement
of Rep. Hayes). Some reporters have used individual cases of misconduct as an opportunity to
"demean all quality control mechanisms in science, particularly peer review and experimental repli-
cation." Woolf, supra note 2, at 89. The press tends to treat misconduct in research as more serious
than other types of fraud. Id. at 88.
46. Broad and Wade note that the structure of science serves to encourage fraud in several
ways. One such aspect of science is the lab chief system, in which junior researchers give the head of
a lab partial credit for discoveries the junior researchers make. BROAD & WADE, supra note 2, at
213-14. Another aspect is the existence of a "celebrity system" among scientists. Id. at 214. Ac-
cording to Broad and Wade, young researchers initially drawn to science in the pursuit of knowl-
edge, may turn cynical when they see that their elders are preoccupied more with the chasing of
scientific honors than with the dispassionate examination of nature. Id. See also KOHN, supra note
2, at 199.
47. "The system, with its heavy emphasis on results, on producing papers, on winning the next
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roots in the increasing number of "careerists" in the scientific commu-
nity.48 According to this view, the scientific research community meas-
ures advancement in terms of the volume of papers a researcher
publishes.49 This pressure to publish leads some researchers to engage in
misconduct to meet the scientific community's considerable
expectations.5
II. AGENCY ATEMPTS TO ADDRESS SCIENTIFIC MISCONDUCT
As a result of an increase in concern over scientific fraud,51 agencies
responsible for distributing grant money have been requiring more ac-
countability from researchers.52 Most agencies, however, rely on the re-
search institution to police its scientists' activities.53 Therefore, the
emerging practice involves a joint effort by the granting agencies and the
scientific community itself. 4 An examination of the policies agencies
adopt to review and control research demonstrates the delicacy of the
problems and interests involved, and shows to what pains agencies will
go to protect those interests.
A. The National Science Foundation
The National Science Foundation (NSF) funds science and engineer-
ing research at many institutions.5 It has promulgated regulations to
address misconduct in federally funded programs.56 The NSF rulemak-
ing addressed three broad issues: the standards under which scientists
should conduct research; the types of procedures institutions should use
in identifying, investigating, and addressing misconduct; and the means
to protect institutions and individuals in cases of misconduct.
research grant, sets up pressures that favor glory-getting and credit-grabbing over the dispassionate
pursuit of truth." BROAD & WADE, supra note 2, at 214.
48. Id. at 38-59.
49. Id. at 56 (while a scientific paper was once a "vehicle for the transmission of scientific truth
... today its importance has been diminished as it more and more has become a tool of the
careerist").
50. Id. at 55-56.
51. See supra note 1.
52. See supra note 1 (congressional hearings); Andersen, supra note 7.
53. See infra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
54. See Andersen, supra note 7, at 147-48. Andersen concludes that institutions' efforts should
focus on the ethical education of aspiring young scientists. Id. at 148.
55. Id. at 122.
56. See 45 C.F.R. § 689 (1990) (misconduct in science and engineering research).
57. Andersen, supra note 7, at 124. Within the NSF, the Division of Audit and Oversight
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The NSF regulations define actionable misconduct as behavior that
deviates from accepted scientific practice or violates a legal require-
ment.5" This definition allows for some flexibility in the classification of a
particular course of conduct.59
Pursuant to NSF regulations, research institutions are primarily re-
sponsible for the discovery and investigation of misconduct.' The regu-
lations require the institution to inform the NSF if a matter is sufficiently
serious," but if the NSF learns of the allegations first, it may conduct its
own inquiry or inform the institution so that it may conduct an internal
(DAO), a division of the NSFs Office of Budget, Audit and Control, handles scientific misconduct.
The DAO conducts investigations and generally coordinates activities related to misconduct. 45
C.F.R. § 689.1(0 (1990).
58. The regulation provides: "'Misconduct' means (1) fabrication, falsification, plagiarism, or
other serious deviation from accepted practices in proposing, carrying out, or reporting results from
research; (2) material failure to comply with Federal requirements for protection of researchers...;
or (3) failure to meet other material legal requirements governing research." 45 C.F.R. § 689.1(a)
(1990). See Andersen, supra note 7, at 126-27 (noting that this "definition" of misconduct leaves
defining the standards governing acceptable practices to the scientific community).
59. The definition permits differences in standards and methods among different areas of sci-
ence. Some disciplines stress certain aspects of research more stringently than others. For example,
disciplines such as physics insist on absolute accuracy in numerical measurements, while a more
relaxed standard prevails in many of the social sciences. Andersen, supra note 7, at 130.
60. The regulation provides:
(a) Awardee institutions bear primary responsibility for prevention and detection of
misconduct. In most instances, NSF will rely on awardee institutions to promptly:
(1) Initiate an inquiry into any suspected or alleged misconduct;
(2) Conduct a subsequent investigation, if warranted; and
(3) Take action necessary to ensure the integrity of research, the rights and interests of
research subjects and the public, and the observance of legal requirements or
responsibilities.
45 C.F.R. § 689.3(a) (1990).
61. The regulation provides in relevant part:
(b) If an institution wishes NSF to defer independent inquiry or investigation, NSF
expects it to:
(3) Notify NSF even before deciding to initiate an investigation or as required during
an investigation (i) if the seriousness of apparent misconduct warrants; (ii) if immediate
health hazards are involved; (iii) if NSF's resources, reputation, or other interests need
protecting; (iv) if Federal action may be needed to protect the interests of a subject of the
investigation or of others potentially affected; or (v) if the scientific community or the
public should be informed.
45 C.F.R. § 689.3(b)(3) (1990). See Andersen, supra note 7, at 132. Andersen describes situations
in which, although the regulations do not so require, the NSF will conduct an investigation of its
own. The NSF will conduct investigations upon receipt of evidence that the misconduct implicates
an institution's high-level officials, if an institution's reports are deficient, if the NSF possesses infor-
mation that strongly contradicts what the institution has reported, or if an institution unnecessarily
delays an investigation. Id. at 133.
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investigation. 2
The regulations call for a variety of sanctions upon the discovery of
misconduct. 63 For the most serious infractions, the government may de-
bar a researcher from further participating in federally funded pro-
grams.64 As the government funds most research, this can be a strong
62. The regulation provides that the agency may: "1) Inform the awardee institution of the
alleged misconduct and encourage it to undertake an inquiry; 2) Defer to inquiries or investigations
of the awardee institution or of another Federal agency; 3) At any time proceed with its own in-
quiry." 45 C.F.R. § 689.4(d) (1990). Whether an agency or the institution proceeds with the inves-
tigation, the agency must provide due process if it sanctions the researcher. Andersen, supra note 7,
at 141. The agency may alter the procedure it accords an accused researcher depending on the
severity of the alleged offenses and the sanctions that would result. Id. at 142-43.
63. See generally Andersen, supra note 7, at 135-38.
64. The regulation provides:
(a) Possible final actions listed below for guidance range from minimal restrictions
(Group I) to the most severe and restrictive (Group III). They are not exhaustive and do
not include possible criminal sanctions.
(1) Group IActions. (i) Send a letter of reprimand to the individual or institution.
(ii) Require as a condition of an award that for a specified period an individual, depart-
ment, or institution obtain special prior approval of particular activities from NSF.
(iii) Require for a specified period that an institutional official other than those guilty
of misconduct certify the accuracy of reports generated under an award or provide assur-
ance of compliance with particular policies, regulations, guidelines, or special terms and
conditions.
(2) Group lActions. (i) Restrict for a specified period designated activities or expendi-
tures under an active award.
(ii) Require for a specified period special reviews of all requests for funding from an
affected individual, department, or institution to ensure that steps have been taken to pre-
vent repetition of the misconduct.
(3) Group III Actions. (i) Immediately suspend or terminate an active award under
appropriate NSF regulations.
(ii) Debar or suspend an individual,, department, or institution from participation in
NSF programs for a specified period after further proceedings under applicable regulations.
(iii) Prohibit participation of an individual as an NSF reviewer, advisor, or consultant
for a specified period.
(1) In deciding what actions are appropriate when misconduct is found, NSF officials
should consider:
(1) How serious the misconduct was;
(2) Whether it was deliberate or merely careless;
(3) Whether it was an isolated event or part of a pattern;
(4) Whether it is relevant only to certain funding requests or awards or to all requests
or awards involving an institution or individual found guilty of misconduct.
(c) Interim actions may include, but are not limited to:
(1) Totally or partially suspending an existing award;
(2) Totally or partially suspending eligibility for NSF awards in accordance with de-
barment-and-suspension regulations;
(3) Proscribing or restricting particular research activities, as, for example, to protect
human or animal subjects;
(4) Requiring special certifications, assurances, or other administrative arrangements
to ensure compliance with applicable regulations or terms of the award;
(5) Requiring more prior approvals by NSF;
(6) Deferring funding action on continuing grant increments;
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sanction. 65 However, the NSF regulations also seek to protect the rights
of accused scientists and the research institutions with whom they affili-
ate.66 Because the publicization of spurious accusations can ruin a ca-
reer, the NSF regulations are especially concerned with handling
allegations carefully.' The regulations require that the investigator han-
dle initial inquiries promptly and discreetly.68 In addition, if the accused
researcher is in the process of applying for new grant money at the time
of such an inquiry, the investigators will not inform those reviewing the
application of the ongoing proceedings.69
The NSF regulations also take pains to protect those who blow the
whistle on researchers engaged in misconduct.7° Blowing the whistle on
someone can be a trying experience.7" Therefore, NSF regulations both
ensure that investigators keep informers' names confidential and exempt
(7) Deferring a pending award;
(8) Restricting or suspending use of individuals as NSF reviewers, advisors, or
consultants.
(d) For those cases governed by the debarment and suspension regulations, the stan-
dards of proof contained in those regulations shall control. Otherwise, NSF will take no
final action under this section without a finding of misconduct supported by a preponder-
ance of the relevant evidence.
45 C.F.R. § 689.2 (1990).
65. See Andersen, supra note 7, at 135-36.
66. See generally id. at 138-45.
67. Id.
68. The regulation provides: "NSF staff who learn of alleged misconduct will promptly and
discreetly inform DAO or refer informants to DAO." 45 C.F.R. § 689.4(a) (1990).
69.
Neither a suspicion or allegation of misconduct nor a pending inquiry or investigation
will normally delay review of proposals. To avoid influencing reviews, reviewers or panel-
ists will not be informed of allegations or of ongoing inquiries or investigation. However, if
allegations, inquiries, or investigations have been rumored or publicized, the responsible
Assistant Director may, in consultation with DAO, either defer review or inform reviewers
of the status of the matter.
45 C.F.R. § 689.6(b) (1990) (emphasis in original).
70. See generally Andersen, supra note 7, at 145-48. The effectiveness of any attempt to deal
with scientific misconduct depends, among other things, on the willingness of those with information
to come forward. Id. at 145.
71. One researcher, Robert L. Sprague, testified before a House of Representatives committee
regarding his attempt to report another researcher's suspected misconduct. Maintaining the Integ-
rity, supra note 1, at 186-89. Sprague attempted to call the misconduct to the attention of a journal,
which had published some allegedly tainted research, but was unable to get the journal to acknowl-
edge the possible misconduct until another publication threatened to publish an account of the mat-
ter. Id. at 187. In addition, the National Institute of Mental Health delayed and reduced Sprague's
grant at the time of his report. Id. As a result of these experiences, Sprague felt that "[w]histle
blowers ... who challenge well-known authorities must be protected. If their allegations are sub-
stantiated, they should not suffer for their actions." Id. at 188. See also KOHN, supra note 2, at 200-
02; Andersen, supra note 7, at 145; Daniel S. Greenberg, Lab-Scam: How Science Goes Bad, WASH.
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investigation records from freedom of information requests.72
B. The Public Health Service
The Public Health Service (PHS) administers many federal grant pro-
grams to medical researchers. Like the NSF, it recently has addressed
the problem of scientific fraud and misconduct in regulations it promul-
gated in August 1989. 73 Many of the PHS' provisions resemble those of
POST, Apr. 24, 1988, at D3 (Dr. Jerome Jacobstein describing how he was made to feel "as if I were
the accused" when he tried to report misconduct).
Recently Margot O'Toole's case has become widely known. See Barbara Carton, The Price of
Principle-Margot O'Toole Blew the Whistle on Her Boss and Paid for Her Courage, CHI. TRIB.,
Apr. 28, 1991, at WC 12; Abigail Trafford, Ivory Tower Whistle-Blowers; Researchers Who Allege
Scientific Fraud Pay a Price, WASH. POST, Mar. 26, 1991, at Z6; The Price Exacted in Battling
Fraud, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 25, 1991, at A20 [hereinafter The Price Exacted]; Joyce Price, Scientific
Whistleblower Cleared After Years of Derision by Peers, WASH. TIMEs, Mar. 22, 1991, at AS. Ms.
O'Toole, a junior researcher at MIT, tried unsuccessfully for six years to call attention to alleged
fraud in the work of Thereza Imanishi-Kari, a more senior researcher. As a result of her protests,
MIT fired Ms. O'Toole. The NIH Office of Scientific Integrity finally vindicated O'Toole when it
reported that Imanishi-Kari had falsified data. Id. Dr. David Baltimore, a Nobel Prize-winning
molecular biologist, co-signed Imanishi-Kari's findings. The Price Exacted, supra. See also supra
note 23 and accompanying text. As a result of O'Toole's claims, Dr. Baltimore apparently attacked
her professional reputation. The Price Exacted, supra. Dr. O'Toole's report led not only to an
investigation, but also to three congressional hearings. Id.
72. The regulation provides:
To the extent possible the identity of informants who wish to remain anonymous will be
kept confidential. To the extent allowed by law, documents and files maintained by NSF
during the course of an inquiry or investigation of misconduct will be treated as investiga-
tive files exempt from mandatory public disclosure upon request under the Freedom of
Information Act.
45 C.F.R. § 689.4(b) (1990). The regulation classifies such records as investigative reports to immu-
nize them from freedom of information requests. Id.
73. See Policies of General Applicability, 54 Fed. Reg. 32,449 (1989). The PHS created the
Office of Scientific Integrity (OSI), which oversees PHS policies and procedures regarding scientific
misconduct. The OSI thus reviews activities of the National Institutes of Health (NIH), an agency
under the aegis of the PHS responsible for the distribution of large grants. Id. at 32,446. See War-
ren E. Leary, On the Trail of Research Misconduct, "Science Police" Take the Limelight, N.Y.
TIMEs, Mar. 25, 1991, at A13 (OSI investigates charges of scientific misconduct brought to its atten-
tion).
The OSI conducts investigations under procedures found in an NIH guidebook. See NATIONAL
INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, GUIDE FOR GRANTS AND CONTRACTS-POLICIES AND PROCEDURES FOR
DEALING WITH POSSIBLE MISCONDUCT IN SCIENCE (1986). A federal district court recently struck
down these guidelines because, although they functioned as rules, they failed to conform with the
Administrative Procedure Act's notice and comment requirements. Abbs v. Sullivan, 756 F. Supp.
1172, 1189 (W.D. Wis. 1990). See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1988) (requiring an agency to allow "inter-
ested persons an opportunity to participate in the rulemaking through submission of written data,
views, or arguments"). The guidelines had allowed the OSI to "impose permanent sanctions on
individuals and institutions found guilty either of engaging in scientific misconduct or permitting it
to occur that can result in great damage to the reputations of individuals and institutions." 756 F.
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the NSF.74
As a condition for a grant application, the PHS requires that an insti-
tution formulate a policy to deal with scientific misconduct in biomedical
or behavioral research.71 This requirement has prompted many institu-
tions to revise their misconduct policies.76 PHS regulations require that
institutional policies contain several features. 77 An institution must in-
vestigate immediately allegations of misconduct and complete an inquiry
within sixty days of its initiation. 78 The PHS regulations require that the
investigator maintain the accused individual's confidentiality to the
Supp. at 1189. The procedures allowed the PHS to take a number of actions before the OSI com-
pleted its investigation. Id. at 1177. These included suspension of an award, suspension of eligibility
for further awards, curtailment of selected research activities, and more restrictive specifications for
further grant applications. Id. The OSI is working on promulgating new regulations that conform
with the APA notice and comment requirements. Robb London, Judge Voids Rules on Scientific
Fraud Inquiries, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 1991, at BI 1.
The court's invalidation of these procedures raised questions about the fairness of OSI methods.
The problem is that the O.S.I. is made up of scientists who are steeped in the academic
tradition of collegiality, of taking care of these things internally, free from outside scru-
tiny.... They've been free to apply the scientific model-where a researcher's scientific
claims are doubted until he is proven otherwise.
Id. (quoting Robert Charrow, an attorney who is an expert regarding scientific misconduct). See
also The Science Cops, WASH. PosT, June 29, 1991, at A22.
74. See generally Andersen, supra note 7.
75. The institution must provide an assurance that it:
(1) Has established an administrative process, that meets the requirements of this Sub-
part, for reviewing, investigating, and reporting allegations of misconduct in science in
connection with PHS-sponsored biomedical and behavioral research conducted at the ap-
plicant institution or sponsored by the applicant; and
(2) Will comply with its own administrative process and the requirements of this Subpart.
42 C.F.R. § 50.103(a)(l)-(2) (1990). The institution must reassert its assurance annually to the OSI.
Id. at (b).
The regulations subject to sanctions an institution that does not fulfill its obligations to conduct
properly an investigation into an alleged case of misconduct: "In addition to sanctions that the
institution may decide to impose, the Department [of Health and Human Services] also may impose
sanctions of its own upon investigators or institutions based upon authorities it possesses or may
possess, if such action seems appropriate." 42 C.F.R. § 50.104(a)(7) (1990). More generally, the
institution "shall foster a research environment that discourages misconduct in all research and that
deals forthrightly with possible misconduct." 42 C.F.R. § 50.105 (1990). If an institution fails to do
this, it may lose its funding, or the OSI may launch its own investigation. Id.
76. See, eg., Linda R. Monroe, UCSD Institutes First Formal Policy on Research Fraud, L.A.
TIMES, Oct. 28, 1988, Part 2, at 1.
77. See generally 42 C.F.R. §§ 50.101-.106 (1990). These subparts outline general policies that
all institutions receiving funds under PHS programs must follow. Id.
78. 42 C.F.R. § 50.103(d)(1) (1990). The institution must write a report detailing the evidence,
statements by witnesses, and conclusions arrived at in the investigation. Id. Additionally, the insti-
tution must provide the party under investigation with a copy of the report. The regulation grants
the individual under investigation the right to comment on the report. Those comments become a
part of the record. Id.
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greatest extent possible and grant him an opportunity to respond.79 In
addition, the institutional policy must allow for a thorough investigation
if, after the initial inquiry, the evidence so warrants.s° Unlike the NSF,8"
the PHS mandates that institutions report all investigations to the rele-
vant agency. 2
C. Research Institution Policies
Since research institutions bear much of the responsibility for policing
scientific misconduct, many have formulated policies to address the prob-
lem. 3 Such a delegation of investigative responsibility raises important
questions.84 Some critics suggest that research institutions have an in-
herent conflict of interest when they conduct investigations of miscon-
duct in their own laboratories.8 5 However, others argue that institutions
79. Id. at (d)(3). The institution's policies also must protect the whistleblower's privacy "to the
maximum extent possible." Id. at (d)(2). If the institution proceeds with an investigation, it must
notify the OSI's director. Id. at (d)(4). In addition, the institution must notify the OSI within 24
hours if "any reasonable indication of possible criminal violations" exists. Id. at (d)(5).
80. Id. at (d)(7). The investigation must proceed:
within 30 days of the completion of the inquiry, if findings from that inquiry provide suffi-
cient basis for conducting an investigation. The investigation normally will include exami-
nation of all documentation, including but not necessarily limited to relevant research data
and proposals, publications, correspondence, and memoranda of telephone calls. When-
ever possible, interviews should be conducted of all individuals involved either in making
the allegation or against whom the allegation is made, as well as other individuals who
might have information regarding key aspects of the allegations; complete summaries of
these interviews should be prepared, provided to the interviewed party for comment or
revision, and included as part of the investigatory file.
Id. The investigation must also include "necessary and appropriate expertise to carry out a thor-
ough and authoritative evaluation of the relevant evidence." Id. at (d)(8). The institution must
provide adequate documentation to substantiate its findings, id. at (d)(10), and it must keep the OSI
informed during, id. at (d)(12), and upon completion of the investigation. Id. at (d)(15). If no
evidence confirms the allegations, the institution must undertake "diligent efforts... to restore the
reputations of persons alleged to have engaged in misconduct." Id. at (d)(13).
81. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
82. 42 C.F.R. § 50.104(a)(1) (1990). The institution must report to the OSI. Id.
83. See supra note 76.
84. See generally Andersen, supra note 7, at 132-35; Woolf, supra note 2, at 83-89. See also
Benjamin Weiser, How Well Do University Researchers Police Themselves; A Case at Georgetown
Raises the Question, WASH. PosT, Jan. 22, 1991, at Z10 (raising questions about the early dismissal
by a university scientific misconduct committee of an inquiry into the activities of a prominent
researcher).
85. Some who have reported misconduct feel that research institutions are biased against them.
Andersen, supra note 7, at 133. Substantial criticism derives from the "inherent conflict of interest
whenever [an institution] performs an investigation of one of its researchers or faculty members,"
because if the investigation reveals misconduct it will damage the institution's reputation. Id.
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have a self interest in preventing all misconduct.8 6 Furthermore, the in-
dividual institution is best situated to design procedures, guided by the
granting agency's basic requirements, 7 that most effectively protect
those involved.
III. THE USE OF THE Qui TAM PROVISION OF THE
FALSE CLAIMS ACT
Congress developed the private plaintiff, or qui tam, action 81 primarily
to address fraud in government contracts.8 9 Congress amended the False
Claims Act in 1986 to encourage individuals to bring qui tam suits to
prevent fraud against the government.' The amendment provided
greater incentives for private plaintiffs to bring such suit. 91 Congress in-
86. Id. at 134-35. Furthermore, sound investigative and detection methods should deter such
conduct from occurring in the first place. Some commentators argue that the institution is poised
best to investigate and punish misconduct. Moreover, an institution can determine best whether and
to what degree a researcher has violated the institution's policies or accepted practices of the field.
Id. Some propose that institutions should take care to prevent potential conflicts of interest by
ensuring that the members of investigative panels are free from bias. Id. at 134. Nonetheless, the
NSF regulations do not provide for such screening. Id.
87. Id. See also supra notes 73-82 and accompanying text.
88. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-30 (1988).
89. Congress initially created the qui tam action in 1863 to combat contractor fraud against the
Union Army during the Civil War. Oparil, supra note 8, at 526. See also S. REP. No. 345, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5267-73.
90. See generally False Claims Act Amendments: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Administra-
tive Law and Governmental Relations of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1986); Overview of False Claims and Fraud Legislation: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986); John Moore, Citizen Prosecutors, 22 NAT'L J. 2006 (1990).
Fraud in defense contracts was a hot topic at the time Congress passed the amendments to the False
Claims Act. See generally Defense Procurement Fraud Law Enforcement: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong.,
1st Ses. (1985); James K. Gordon, Defense Dept Has Debarred 322 Contractors in Fiscal 1986,
AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, Oct. 6, 1986, at 69; Charlie Gofen, Crying Foul Over
Defense Spending Poll of Hawks, Doves and Others Shows Perception of Waste and Fraud, WASH.
PosT., Aug. 19, 1986, at AI5 (poll shows that 65% of U.S. citizens believe fraud in defense spending
is higher now than it has been in last two decades); 19 Tied to Defense Industry Indicted in Kickback
Schemes, WASH. POST, July 15, 1986, at A7; One General the Defense Department Can't Fire, U.S.
NEws & WORLD REP., Dec. 16, 1985, at 7 (Defense Department suspended General Dynamics for
allegedly charging the Department $7.5 million in cost overruns); Michael Weisskopf, Air Force
Bought Tools it Didn't Need or Use; GAO Says Contractor Got Blank Check, WASH. PoST, Sept. 22,
1985, at A6 (overcharges to the Air Force included an $8,832 tool that did not work; the contractor
later reduced the price to $370); Tony Kaye, It's Waste as Usual at the Pentagon, 240 THE NATION
721, June 15, 1985 (General Electric suspended for allegedly overcharging the Air Force for labor
costs in the sum of $800,000).
91. See Oparil, supra note 8, at 555; Moore, supra note 90, at 2008.
Washington University Open Scholarship
656 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 70:639
creased the possible sum awarded to private plaintiffs, or relators, provid-
ing for a floor of twenty-five percent and a ceiling of thirty percent of the
suit or settlement's proceeds. 2 Furthermore, the 1986 amendment pro-
vides for treble damages9 3 compared to the earlier law, which allowed
only for double damages.94
A qui tam suit has a number of prerequisites, some of which are juris-
dictional.9" The most important of these is the requirement that the per-
92. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(2) (1988). The plaintiff is eligible for the maximum award if the Justice
Department decides not to join the suit and the plaintiff prosecutes the case alone. If the Justice
Department takes over the suit, however, the private plaintiff may receive between 15% and 25% of
the proceeds. Id. at (d)(1). The earlier version of the False Claims Act defined the private plaintiff's
return as a reasonable amount not to exceed 25% of the proceeds. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2) (1982).
See also Oparil, supra note 8, at 558. Under certain circumstances, the court may reduce the private
plaintiff's award. This may occur, for example, when the plaintiff affirmatively is involved in the
misconduct. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(3) (1988). The court may award attorney's fees and expenses to a
prevailing defendant if the plaintiff continues the action without the government's participation and
the court concludes that the action was "clearly frivolous, clearly vexatious, or brought primarily for
purposes of harassment." Id. at (d)(4).
In addition, the amendments protect the private plaintiff against retaliation by his or her
employer:
Any employee who is discharged, demoted, suspended, threatened, harassed,... because
of lawful acts... in furtherance of an action under this section ... shall be entitled to all
relief necessary to make the employee whole. Such relief shall include reinstatement with
the same seniority status such employee would have had but for the discrimination, 2 times
the amount of back pay, interest on the back pay, and compensation for any special dam-
ages sustained as a result of the discrimination, including litigation costs and reasonable
attorneys' fees.
Id. at (h).
93. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (1988). In addition to the treble damages, the court may find a defend-
ant liable for penalties additional to actual damages. These penalties may run from $5,000 to
$10,000. Id. See also Oparil, supra note 8, at 555. Others who face liability include: "Any person
who:... (2) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or statement to get
a false or fraudulent claim paid or approved by the Government; (3) conspires to defraud the Gov-
ernment by getting a false or fraudulent claim allowed or paid." 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(l)-(7) (1988).
94. 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (1982).
95. Section (e) lists certain actions barred:
(2)(A) No court shall have jurisdiction over an action brought under [the Act] against a
Member of Congress, a member of the judiciary, or senior executive branch official if the
action is based on evidence or information known to the Government when the action was
brought.
(3) In no event may a person bring an action under [this Act] which is based on allega-
tions or transactions which are the subject of a civil suit or an administrative civil money
penalty proceeding in which the Government is already a party.
(4)(A) No court shall have jurisdiction over an action under this section based upon the
public disclosure of allegations or transactions in a criminal, civil, or administrative hear-
ing, in a congressional, administrative, or [GAO] report, hearing, audit, or investigation, or
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son bringing the action be the "original source." 96 The relator must have
"direct and independent knowledge of the information" forming the ba-
sis of the action. 97 The potential plaintiff also must offer the information
to the government before bringing suit.98
Once the relator has brought suit, the Justice Department may join
it.99 The Act also allows the government to dismiss the suit once it noti-
fies the relator.l °° The court may limit the individual plaintiff's control
over the litigation upon a government showing that the case so war-
rants.101 For example, a case may so warrant when the private plaintiff's
participation unduly burdens the defendant or when the government sus-
pects that the private plaintiff brought the suit to harass the defendant."12
The 1986 amendment makes the qui tam provision of the False Claims
Act a very powerful weapon; 0 3 so powerful that even the Justice Depart-
ment expressed reservations about the wisdom of the added incentives." °
These reservations stemmed from a concern about possible private plain-
from the news media, unless the action is brought by the Attorney General or the person
bringing the action is the original source of the information.
31 U.S.C. § 3730(e) (1988).
96. Id. at (e)(4)(A)-(B). The "original source" is "an individual who has direct and independ-
ent knowledge of the information on which the allegations are based and has voluntarily provided
the information to the Government before filing an action under this section which is based on the
information." Id. at (B).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at (b)(2). The court seals the complaint in camera for at least 60 days while the Justice
Department decides whether it will intervene. Id.
100. Id. at (c)(2)(A). The government may also settle the action on its own if the court deter-
mines after a hearing that the proposed settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable under all the
circumstances. Id. at (c)(2)(B).
101. Id. at (c)(2)(C)-(D).
102. Id. at (c)(2)(D).
103. See supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text for a description of the increased incentives
and greater penalties.
104. Richard K. Willard, Assistant Attorney General, articulated these concerns to a Senate
Committee conducting a hearing into false claims and fraud legislation in 1986. Overview of False
Claims and Fraud Legislation, supra note 89, at 5 (statement of Richard K. Willard, Assistant
Attorney General, Civil Division, Department of Justice). Willard stated that "[b]ecause of the
demonstrated, consistent misuse of the current qui tam statute to bring frivolous, politically-moti-
vated lawsuits, the Justice Department has strong reservations about any effort to further liberalize
this provision." Id. at 12. Although changes in the original bill allayed these fears somewhat, Wil-
lard noted that the Justice Department continued to have reservations about the qui tam action. Id.
See also Moore, supra note 89, at 2009. Some in the Justice Department would prefer to see a
system of incentives that rewards whistleblowers financially, leaving enforcement efforts solely under
the control of the Justice Department. Id. at 2010.
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tiff misuse of the cause of action.1 05  In several instances, evidence sug-
gests that a private plaintiff used the qui tam action to harass a rival or to
serve political goals.1°6 Although the Justice Department will dismiss
cases brought for improper motives, many times the defendant must re-
tain counsel before the Department dismisses the suit. 107
Furthermore, the legislators' overriding concern in designing the new
amendment was to respond to a perceived increase in fraud by companies
under contract to the government, most often in defense fields. 108 In de-
105. See Moore, supra note 89, at 2010.
106. The Department of Justice submitted a letter to a congressional hearing on the False Claims
Acts Amendments describing a number of cases private plaintiffs brought, some of which "appear to
have purposes other than or in addition to the collection of money for the United States." See False
Claims Act Amendments, supra note 90, at 170. In one case brought under the False Claims Act,
the claimant sought to recover funds from a university that allegedly wrongfully denied him tenure.
The plaintiff claimed that, because the university received government contract and research grant
funds, the denial of tenure came within the scope of the False Claims Act. Id. at 171 (describing the
United States v. University of Colorado, Civil No. 82-M-806 (D. Colo.)).
The Justice Department's letter cited a number of other cases in which political or other motives
may have underlain the action. Id. at 170-71 (citing United States ex rel. Martin-Trigona v. Gerald
Ford, Civil No. 76-1374 (D.D.C.) (suit brought against presidential candidates for accepting match-
ing funds against allegedly illegal campaign contributions); United States ex rel. Thompson v. Pen-
dergast, Civil No. 76-7006 (D.D.C.) (suit brought against the Sergeant-at-Arms of the House of
Representatives for accepting pay and performing no House duties in return for assisting the Demo-
cratic Campaign Committee); United States ex rel. U.S.-Namibia Trade & Cultural Council, Inc. v.
South West Africa People's Org., 585 F. Supp. 632 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (action against apparently rival
organization for receipt of United Nations funds in alleged violation of the False Claims Act)).
107. False ClaimsActAmendments, supra note 97, at 172 (letter from John R. Bolton, Assistant
Attorney General, to the subcommittee chairman).
108. Representative Glickman discussed the purposes of the amendments to the False Claims
Act at the opening of the House hearings on the subject. Id. at 1-3 (opening statement of Rep.
Glickman, subcommittee chairman). He noted that "legislative movement in this area has been
spurned by reports of fraudulent activities involving Pentagon contracts-and I might also mention
HHS contracts as well-but the fact of the matter is that the legislation we are considering will
impact Government contracts across the board." Id. at 2. See also supra note 90. Congress further
explained the need for legislative action:
Evidence of fraud in Government programs and procurement is on a steady rise. In 1984,
the Department of Defense conducted 2,311 fraud investigations, up 30 percent from 1982.
Similarly, the Department of Health and Human Services has nearly tripled the number of
entitlement program fraud cases referred for prosecution over the past 3 years.... While
fraud is obviously not limited to any one Government agency, defense procurement fraud
has received heightened attention over the past few years. In 1985... 45 of the 100 largest
defense contractors, including 9 of the top 10, were under investigation for multiple fraud
offenses.
S. REP. No. 345, supra note 89, at 5267. Rep. Howard Berman, a co-author of the 1986 amend-
ments, explained that they "will serve as a major new tool to encourage direct citizen action against
contractors who defraud the government." Statement of Rep. Berman, quoted in Weinstein, New
Whistle-Blower Law Hailed; Berman Calls it a Major Tool Against Contract Fraud, L.A. TIMES,
Nov. 4, 1986, at 24. Most of the testimony in the congressional hearings preceding the amendments
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fense fields, a whistleblower faces grave consequences as a result of in-
forming on an employer. °9
Fraud in defense and similar fields is of a different nature, however,
than that carried on in the scientific arena. In science, it is by no means a
practice that has the acquiescence of the community as a whole as might
be the case when a defense contractor systematically defrauds the gov-
ernment.11t As a result of this acquiescence, each of a contractor's indi-
vidual employees is under extreme pressure not to inform.11 Congress
meant to address this problem through the added incentives to the qui
tam provision.
The most likely plaintiff in a scientific misconduct case would be a
fellow researcher or a laboratory technician. Such individuals are most
likely to have firsthand knowledge of misconduct and to recognize it as
such. 1 2 They would not face the extreme pressure to refrain from di-
vulging such information that a defense contractor's employee would ex-
perience, however, because the scientific community as a whole does not
support misconduct in any way. 13
concerned defense contract fraud. S. REP. No. 345, supra note 89, at 5269-71. Congress saw de-
fense contract fraud as pervasive. Id. at 5268. The Department of Justice estimated its losses from
fraud in 1985 at between one and ten billion dollars. Id.
109. S. REP. No. 345, supra note 89, at 5270-71.
110. In some instances, defense contractors defrauded the government with the company super-
visors' knowledge and encouragement. A whistleblower in that case most likely would be a worker
caught up in a "conspiracy of silence." The legislative history stated that "[tihe Committee believes
changes are necessary to halt the so-called 'conspiracy of silence' that has allowed fraud against the
government to flourish." Id. at 5271. The cost of betraying this conspiracy might be a worker's job
and livelihood. Id. at 5270. The legislative history noted that one worker "concluded not only from
his own experience but from talking to his fellow workers that there is 'absolutely no encouragement
or incentive' for individuals working in the defense industry to report fraud." Id.
S11. lad One employee who finally did inform described the reaction of his supervisors:
They reacted angrily, calling me anti-management, anti-Rockwell, and a pain in the
ass.... Gradually, I was squeezed out of the work I was doing. I was stripped of my
confidential security, my access to documents was limited, I was excluded from meetings
and was put to work doing menial tasks outside my job description, such as sweeping,
making coffee, and cleaning a 50 gallon coffee pot.
Id. at 5270 (quoting False Claims Reform Act: Hearings on S. 1562 Before the Subcomm. on Admin-
istrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. 81
(1985)).
112. One commentator found that in 22 of 26 reported cases of misconduct, one of the primary
factors in the detection of the misconduct was reports by present or former co-workers. Woolf,
supra note 2, at 82. See also Olswang & Lee, supra note 18, at 55 ("In most cases, allegations of
scientific misconduct are lodged by co-workers or technical support staff who either witness the
fraudulent recording of data or identify discrepancies when comparing data collected.").
113. Rather, agencies and institutions have been unwilling to investigate allegations. See BROAD
& WADE, supra note 2, at 213-15. This, rather than a motivation to seek revenge against the
Washington University Open Scholarship
660 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 70:639
IV. ANALYSIS AND PROPOSAL
Fraud in scientific research is a potentially serious problem that grant-
ing agencies must confront effectively. Any method of dealing with sci-
entific misconduct that has the potential to sacrifice the free exchange of
ideas is not, however, worth its cost. In coordination with federal agen-
cies, the scientific community must develop methods that balance the
government's legitimate interest in keeping track of its money and ensur-
ing that institutions spend that money on worthwhile projects, with the
preservation of an atmosphere conducive to scientific pursuits.
A. Qui Tam Actions Are Inappropriate in the Scientific Fraud Arena
The use of private-plaintiff actions to expose dishonest researchers and
regain misused government funds inflicts much greater costs than it ulti-
mately saves. Congress never envisioned that private-plaintiff actions
would apply to scientific misconduct. During hearings on scientific mis-
conduct, one congressman emphasized that Congress should not intro-
duce the "liability explosion" into research and development."
t 4
Congress also was concerned that observers not view the hearings as ad-
versarial, but rather as a cooperative effort to ensure the integrity of
research.' 15
whistleblower, made it difficult for whistleblowers to come forward with claims of misconduct. See
supra notes 20, 70. Overcoming this hurdle will allow whistleblowers to make complaints. How-
ever, this is not to say that a whistleblower in the scientific community has an easy task. See supra
note 70, for examples of difficulties that a whistleblower faces. As whistleblowers begin to come
forward, the system should take their complaints more seriously. However, unlike the defense con-
tracting field, the scientific community does not accept misconduct tacitly. See Maintaining the
Integrity, supra note 1, at 14 (testimony of Dr. Lyle W. Bivens, Acting Director, Office of Scientific
Integrity Review, HHS).
114. During hearings on scientific misconduct, Representative Ritter raised concerns of abuse:
"But we need to be careful here.... We are seeing a liability explosion in America, and the entire
field of retractions and corrections of scientific papers is ripe for some serious libel litigation, and [we
should not] bring the liability explosion deeply into the process of research and development."
Maintaining the Integrity, supra note 1, at 7 (statement of Rep. Ritter).
115. Representative Hayes made the following statement at the opening to a hearing, referring to
the scientific community:
[W]hat we ask of you is not a confrontational hearing where we are calling names and
hunting witches, but instead we are asking you to give us the assurance of a mecha-
nism.... [W]ith the assurance not that we will create a perfect world, not that we will have
no instances whatsoever of wrongdoing, but that I can go home . . . and assure those
people that the dollars that we spend on research... are well spent.
Id. at 7-8. Implicit in this remark is the idea that the scientific community has primary responsibil-
ity for dealing with misconduct among its ranks. See also id. at 12 (statement of Rep. Valentine)
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Because of the possibilities for abuse,116 heavy liability,117 and inevita-
ble publicity that accompany False Claims Act suits, 118 its use in alleged
instances of scientific misconduct is inappropriate. Congress designed
the Act to address a different type of problem. 1 9
Since many federal agencies distribute grant money to scientists
through the institutions in which they work,12 institutions risk liability
in qui tam suits.121 The treble damage and civil penalty provisions122 of
the False Claims Act could lead to a multimillion-dollar judgment
against a university.123 While such sanctions might be appropriate when
a profit-generating corporation defrauds the government, 124 they go be-
yond what the circumstances call for when applied to a university that
serves as a host institution.
125
(noting that the proceedings are not adversarial and that, rather then trying to "meddle," Congress
is inquiring into what the scientific community is doing to police itself).
One Congressman phrased his concerns this way:
I know that the scientific community is actively seeking ways to prevent misconduct and to
promote responsible research practice, as well as ways to improve the way it investigates
allegations of misconduct, but they do not need congressional truth police descending into
labs and creating confusion. Such an initiative would be yet another example of Congress
actively destroying science.
Id. at 8 (statement of Rep. Walker).
116. See supra notes 104-07 and accompanying text.
117. See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
118. See supra note 1.
119. See supra notes 88-113, 104, 108-10 and accompanying text.
120. An institution can apply for a grant itself. 42 C.F.R. § 52.3(a) (1991). Some grants may
only be applied for by agencies or institutions. See 42 C.F.R. § 52a.3 (1991).
121. An institution to which Congress has granted funds "assumes legal and financial accounta-
bility for the awarded funds and for the performance of the supported activities." 42 C.F.R.
§ 50.102 (1991).
122. See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
123. In the Darsee case, the accused scientist worked in the lab of an eminent researcher who
received more than $3 million in grants from the National Institutes of Health. While the head
researcher was not at fault in that case, the amount of the grant demonstrates the institution's poten-
tial liability. See supra note 23. In a pending case, supra note 10, a plaintiff named a scientist and
two universities as defendants in a qui tam suit for alleged scientific misconduct. The plaintiff claims
$1.2 million in damages. If the plaintiff wins, the court could treble the damages and add an addi-
tional $5,000 to S10,000 civil penalty. Id.
124. See supra notes 108-11 and accompanying text. The False Claims Act amendments' legisla-
tive history points out the difficulty of prosecuting large, profitable corporations. It noted that
"when large, profitable corporations are the subject of a fraud investigation [they are] able to devote
many times the manpower and resources available to the Government." S. REP. No. 345, supra
note 89, at 5273.
125. While the use of the False Claims Act may in fact work to prevent some misconduct, the
real question is what will be lost in the process. The chilling effect of such liability outweighs
whatever benefit it realizes. See supra note 114.
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In addition to these concerns, scientific misconduct's very nature
makes it unsuited for the use of private plaintiff actions. The varying
degrees of blameworthiness involved in scientific fraud not only make it
difficult to impose the same liability on all scientists guilty of some form
of misconduct, 126 but also may result in the imposition of the False
Claims Act's devastating liability upon a researcher innocent of inten-
tional misconduct.1 27 The treble damage and penalty provisions apply
without regard to the violation's seriousness. 2
The nature of a civil action, an adversarial proceeding in a public fo-
rum, might destroy or seriously impair the accused scientist's career.129
It is, thus, necessary to stop spurious claims at an early stage.
130
For these reasons, Congress should disallow the use of private plaintiff
actions in the prosecution of scientific misconduct claims. If Congress is
unwilling totally to ban the use of these suits, it should require that pri-
vate plaintiffs exhaust administrative remedies before they bring suit. At
a minimum, courts should not hear such suits without being certain that
the private plaintiff has notified the agency responsible for the grant and
has given the agency a sufficient chance to address the charges. 131 Fur-
thermore, the Justice Department should readily exercise its option to
dismiss such a suit1 32 when a chance exists that the proceedings will un-
duly prejudice the defendant or when the private plaintiff's motive is to
harass. If the Department is unwilling to dismiss a suit, it should none-
theless make use of the Act's provisions that allow it to control the suit
closely. 13
3
126. See supra notes 19-36 and accompanying text.
127. See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
128. There is little discretion available in the determination of the penalty under the False
Claims Act. See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
129. See supra note 26.
130. Both the NSF and the PHS allow the research institutions to make initial inquiries to deter-
mine whether the complaint warrants further action. This allows for the quick and relatively pain-
less dispatch of unfounded claims. See supra notes 66-69, 78-79 and accompanying text. The filing
of a suit in federal court pursuant to the False Claims Act compels the accused to retain counsel and
inevitably will gain a considerable amount of publicity. See, e.g., supra note 23. Even if the court
promptly dismisses the case, a shadow may always remain on the accused researcher's career,
131. The False Claims Act requires a plaintiff to inform the government of the claim before
bringing suit. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
132. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
133. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
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B. Alternative Agency Regulations
The agencies responsible for administering grants have recognized the
delicate balance of interests involved in the arena of scientific misconduct
and are developing new ways to deal with such misconduct.1 34 These
agencies have gone to great pains to maintain confidential investigations.
Thus, they recognize the serious nature of the dangers involved. 135 Fur-
thermore, these policies currently are evolving and must develop further
in light of experience.136
However, agencies should take additional steps to improve the effec-
tiveness of their schemes. For example, one commentator has suggested
that agencies should require research institutions to screen the panels in-
vestigating charges of misconduct both to discern bias and to guarantee
neutrality. 137 A scheme would thus protect an accused scientist during
the investigation following a charge of misconduct while also ensuring
that reviewing panels adequately investigate charges.1 31
V. CONCLUSION
The maintenance of a vigorous and dynamic scientific community is of
paramount interest to the entire Nation. Congress should not inject the
fear of liability into the scientific research process. Congress instead
should encourage the maintenance of America's rich tradition of scien-
tific innovation in an atmosphere conducive to the free exchange of ideas.
The current system may well be far from perfect. Observers must judge
any additions to that system not only from the standpoint of the fraud
134. See supra notes 55-87 and accompanying text.
135. See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
136. The NSF regulations have been in force since 1987 and the PHS regulations since 1989.
Therefore, the effect of these regulations, in all probability, has not yet been fully felt. See Andersen,
supra note 7 (recognizing the ongoing nature of funding agencies' attempts to develop methods of
dealing with scientific misconduct).
137. Id. at 134.
138. Id. Concerns such as these arose recently when a university committee investigating
charges of scientific misconduct dismissed the charges at an initial stage. Weiser, supra note 83. In
this case, the committee appears to have readily accepted their colleague's defense. Upon receiving
complaints from the initial relator and another researcher, the NIH launched its own investigation
into the matter. Id.
A panel of the National Academy of Sciences recently proposed improving the safeguards against
scientific misconduct. The panel suggested the establishment of an independent body to create uni-
fied ethical standards and to monitor scientific misconduct cases throughout the country. See Philip
J. Hilts, Panel Urges Independent Body to Set Ethical Standards in Science, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28,
1991, at D21. The standards would provide independent researchers and institutions with universal
standards by which to judge alleged instances of scientific misconduct. Id.
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such additions may prevent, but also from the harm they may cause.
From this perspective, the use of qui tam provisions has little to contrib-
ute to the prevention of scientific fraud.
Christopher P. Perzan
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